Відео

People bickering over whether Grant or Lee was the better general. Grant was not in a Who's-The-Better-Military-Genius Contest. He was too busy dealing with a war he had to win. And he WON. In a struggle where all the best people, every highly recommended expert with all the right boxes checked on their resumes had *_already failed._* I always want to ask his critics "Who would *_you_* have put in command? Who was there, in 1864, who could have taken command of US forces and delivered the final victory?"

Impressive now Earth Shattering back then !!! So much for magazine bans based upon history...

What book does he say to read at 43:50, listened 3 times and can’t make it out enough to find it on Google !

traitors within will also lose a war.

My Dad told the story of an officer who insisted to an American officer. My Dad’s sergeant said, in effect, “Tough you are surrendering to me or I will beat the hell out of you”. The officer surrendered,

Oh, I thought you were talking about the American Soldiers, who sacrificed everything to fight for these people. I keep getting asked what's it like being in a war zone and I keep answering "You'd have to be there", Nice try!

Custer was a raping, warmongering, swell-headed prevaricator.

Still miles better than Emma and her 2 moms from San Francisco

These commercials hooked me. No regrets

First of all, turning points often are the punctual and sum total or symbolic expression of a number of disparate relevant factors, or turning factors, so to speak. Many things lead to the Axis defeat from the beginning, which is not to mean that things might not have gone a different way. If we are to look into particular events that may be seen as key enough, relevant and symbolic enough, we face the problem that relevant and symbolic enough don't necessarily go together. To me, if we are to pick something relevant, I would pick Hitler's decision to delay Operation Barbarossa. (He thus delayed taking Moscow twice.) Hitler's decision to clear the Balkans first, Yugoslavia and Greece, before going into the USSR was a serious strategic mistake. Hitler underestimated both the role of winter and the USSR's industrial capacity, as well as its potential to bounce back with massive US support. But how can a non-event (not to invade the USSR earlier) be symbolic enough? It cannot. It lead to Stalingrad and other conspicuous defeats, but it is the latter that are symbolic, because they did happen. Hitler failed to bring Spain into the war alongside the Axis. That, which was again a non-event, was a generally overlooked and underestimated strategic blunder. But in my opinion, which is that of a simple reader of history, not an historian, if I am pressed to pick a single factor, I would choose Germany's delay of Operation Barbarossa. Had Nazi Germany swept earlier the USSR, the whole war would have gone entirely differently. Hitler failed to secure as fast as was required the USSR's landmass and resources. That was absolutely key, at least until the event of nuclear power. But would the US have used atomic bombs against an enemy that would be so strongly in control of the ground, from the Atlantic shore to the Pacific? How could a few atomic bombs dislodge Nazi and Imperial Japan's power over most of Eurasia, just destroying a few cities? How or rather why would the US and Great Britain pursue that war? It is very possible that, had Germany thoroughly defeated the USSR during 1941-42, the world would have soon slipped into a different Cold War, opposing a US-led western world of liberal democracies on one side, and a fascist instead of communist block on the other side. The UK would have become a sort of Taiwan, facing fascist Eurasia. In the long run, the fascist block might have had more chances to prevail. Today, we face a rising fascist block from the ashes of "communism". Political scientists and historians are pretty fastidious not accepting to broaden the concept of fascism, which is a deep mistake, because it fails to address the issue of what underlied historical fascism, what was its essential nature, instead of it form. Any totalitarianism is essentially fascist. The USSR and the PRC are essentially fascist. So-called "communist regimes" are fascist. Iran's theocracy is fascist. Islamism is fascist. Whoever seeks to regiment people and impose their will through force are fascists. If we understand that, we can still defeat fascism, but it's getting late. The PRC is the equivalent today of Nazi Germany. The free world needs to fight for democracy and human rights, understanding that they must be fought for both at home and abroad. We did neither, essentially, since 1989. We have mostly squandered 35-40 years. Our societies are only skin-deep democratic, which makes us weaker.

Hitler had two enemies. The one he knew about was the Soviet Union. The one he didn't know about was General Franz Halder. Franz Halder redirected resources from Blau to Army Group Center. Removing troops from Blau to other place might have been because they could not be supplied. We should be very grateful for the stupidity of Franz Halder.

40:48 😂😂😂😂😂😂👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻👏🏻🏆💯🍻👍🏻

Be the best janitor you can be. What they really teach you is how to scub toilets and mop floors.

Thank you!

27:30

Alec has 10 lawyers and a PI & they still sound terrible bc per the nm law, alec is as guilty as john gotti.

Wanted to watch it, BUT, the "head mic" is ABYSMAL! Just can't watch it at all...

Is Colonel Black still alive? It would be amazing to see those interview tapes with the veterans.

What the professor failed to mention is that the vast majority of Jews gassed was carried out from 1943 to 1945. From the regime’s perspective, it was never about conquering Russia. Everyone knows that was never in the cards. This was a war of annihilation, that was the objective. Not to conquer, but to annihilate. And I suggest this is the real reason they fought on past 1943. The answer is hidden in plain sight. In this regard, the Nazis were, unfortunately, very successful. They killed so many Jews right up to the last day, that they could boast, “mission accomplished”. Compared to pre-WW2, Continental Europe is basically “Jew free”. Which is ironic, of course, because today’s nearly childless generation of Germans is on track to being replaced by wave after wave of Muslim illegal immigrants, most of whom openly hate German culture. Bad karma, I guess.

Why didn’t he do more lectures?

Got to like this man..knows his subject.

This was an interesting lecture but there are a number of important issues that need to be noted. HITLER WAS GIVEN POWER, HE DID NOT TAKE IT. 1:02:35 "Hitler met with his senior military commanders the most senior generals and admirals three days after taking power ... " But Hitler did not "TAKE" power, he was given it. In the Nov 1932 elections the NSDAP (Nazi Party) lost 2 million votes compared to the Jul 1932 elections and its total vote (33.1 percent) was once again below the combined KPD (communist) and SPD (social-democrat) vote (37.3 percent). The crisis deepened and the Nazi Party itself was in turmoil. The noted American historian, Henry Ashby Turner, in a recent study of the last stage of the Nazi rise to power states: "... The November election dealt a staggering blow to Hitler and his party. After an unbroken succession of dramatic gains over the previous three years, the Nazi juggernaut faltered. Many voters who had cast their ballots for the Nazis in July in the expectation that they would soon come to power and provide quick, decisive remedies to Germany’s plight, defected in frustration at the failure of Hitler’s bid for the chancellorship." [Henry A. Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996), pp. 14-15] Ex WWI General Kurt von Schleicher was the leading advocate within the German government of the Zähmungskonzept (taming concept) where the Nazis were to be "tamed" by being brought into the government. But he also enlisted the services of the Nazi Party's SA as an auxiliary force for the Reichswehr from 1931 onward. Schleicher had been critical to bringing down the Bruning government at the start of 1932 after it had banned the SA and SS. After the new Von Papen government lifted the ban and the SA and SS, they were encouraged to renew their political violence. Schleicher then supported Hitler's demand for the Chancellorship in August 1932, but President Hindenburg refused. Schleicher then helped confect an "analysis" which showed that if martial law was declared, the Reichswehr would not be able to defeat the various paramilitary groups, which undermined Von Paper and led to Schleicher's appoint as Chancellor on December 3, 1932. But Schleicher's plan to win the support of Strasser's "left" faction of the NSDAP failed. Despite the significant loss of votes in the most recent election by the end of January it was decided by the leaders of German capitalism that the time had come to make Hitler Chancellor with Von Papen in the cabinet, and this was done on 30 January 1933. What was all this about? The first task of the new government was to smash the workers movement in Germany. The Nazis were not just concerned with "Judeo-Bolshevism" in the Soviet Union. Despite a mass antifascist sentiment among German workers the leaderships of the KPD and SPD insisted on respecting the legal government and even promoted the myth that the repression would accelerate the transition to socialism. Some in the SPD used the slogan "First Hitler, then us" ["Nach Hitler, Kommen Wir"]. Even by April 1 the Stalinist Comintern was making a similar claim. The trade unions leaders, which in 1932 had already with Schleicher not to organize a general strike against a dictatorship, were all arrested on May 2, the day after government approved May Day marches were held. Schleicher, Strasser and the leadership of the SA were executed on 30 June 1934 during the Night of the Long Knives. STABBED IN THE BACK WAS CONSCIOUSLY CREATED MYTH BY LUDENDORFF TO EXCUSE THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND 30:31 "I'm sure most of you heard of is the infamous stab-in-the-back legend. According to this the German army was never defeated in the first world war, never defeated in the field but it was betrayed by Jews and leftist on the home front..." 52:34 "it seems incredible but as far as I've been able to ascertain they really did buy into this it's perhaps a little bit more understandable when we think about the fact that most of the German officers of the World War 2 era were not in the high command at the end of World War 1 there were really only a few people around who could have said oh yeah by the way we made him you know see sense when Ludendorff was one of the primary instigators of this thing came forward and said 'yes, we were stabbed in the back' a lot of people took him at his word he was a war hero" "Ludendorff was one of the primary instigators of this thing" wasn't mentioned in the lecture and it doesn't explain why he confected this myth and how he expected it to work. Ludendorff said to his staff on 1 October, 1917 (five weeks before the armistice!): "I have ... asked His Majesty to include in the government those circles who are largely responsible for things having developed as they have. We will now see these gentlemen move into the ministries. Let them be the ones to sign the peace treaty that must now be negotiated. Let them eat the soup that they have cooked for us!" Thus the myth wasn't just mean to blame socialists for the defeat, it was meant to have them take responsibility. FWIW the phrase "stabbed in the back" was suggested to Ludendorff by British general Sir Neill Malcolm in 1919 over dinner. The Wikipedia entry for "Stab-in-the-back myth" is excellent, in my opinion. WHY WEREN'T "ALL OF GERMANY'S MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCE" MOBILIZED UNTIL 1943? 31:51 "... army officers believed that the next war was inevitable, there had to be another war. World War one was in effect round one ... if Germany was going to regain its honor, its freedom, its national independence and its economic and cultural rejuvenation along with a position of world power, second that war would have to be a total war in which all of Germany's material and human resources would have to be mobilized in order to achieve victory" Why then didn't Germany mobilize its population for "total war" until 1943? All their opponents had done so and Germany had a smaller industrial base. The use of terror and violence had created a veneer of mass support for the Nazi regime but they were quite conscious this didn't run deep. They believed that the home front privations in WWI had weakened support for the war effort and attempts were made to shield the German population from similar issues through the use of slave labor, for as long as possible. I recommend "Inside Nazi Germany : conformity, opposition, and racism in everyday life" (Detlev Peukert, 1987)

Genuine question. When in the war did Patton's army face Rommel's?

My Dad was at Bastogne. I think the knowledge of siege of Bastogne comes from mainly the contemporary news reports culminating in Brigadier General MacAulife’s “NUTS” response to the German demand of surrender. I read in other sources that Hitler believed that Eisenhower was little authority on the battlefield. The majority of the planners had litte or no experience American military prowess directly. Market-Garden was pretty much a British show.

What a diverse history without mentioning about Indonesia/Nusantara/Southeast Asia. 41:23 thats the 64.000 dollar question 😂

Amazing talk about Harrisburg and the 1863 campaign! Thanks!

gg

Well done! I once lectured at AHEC. Great place, and you fit the excellent standard.

So basically the rational strategy for the German High command would be to … assassinate Hitler then either negotiate a separate piece with the United States and Britain or just surrender unilaterally. There was an assassination attempt on Hitler in July. I think that should’ve been mentioned. It was also disappointing that there was no mention of the developments on the eastern front. Glantz has said the great strategic event of July and August 1944 was the destruction of Wehrmacht army group centre as a result of the Operation Bagration. Surely they should’ve been mentioned as the reason why Hitler saw no chance of a strategic victory against the Red Army. The great myth that the Western Allies defeated Nazi Germany will not die easily. Given the United States is preparing for a two front war - against Russia in and through Ukraine and against China - I careful study of the continued use of force when a war is lost is urgently needed.

Interesting lecture, shame he did not elaborate on what happened at South Georgia, Ever heard of a Platoon of RM's disabling a Argentinian warship, research it.

49:54 "... again as another typical example of Stalinist whims, or whoever dictated this, just of how badly the Red Army intellectually had been degraded by the purges" It's very enlightening. What becomes clear is the success of the Wehrmacht during Operation Barbarossa was primarily due to the politics of Stalin and his henchmen. From September 1939 to June 1941 they had time to study German military operations in Poland, France and North Africa, they had Isserson's "defence in depth" doctrine on their bookshelves, they just needed to apply it. How did the largest land invasion in human history - 3.3 million soldiers - from a regime that had openly declared one of its prime aims was to destroy the Soviet Union come as a "surprise"? While Stalin purged the Red Army on trumped up charges (14:33) and (not mentioned) using confessions extracted under torture, it was Stalin who agreed to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which allowed the Nazis to launch WWII on favorable terms and then to invade the USSR on favorable terms. The purges reflected a conscious appreciation by Stalin and his henchmen of the mass opposition to their policies, especially allowing the Nazis to destroy the independent organisations of the German working class without any opposition and the subsequent growing threat of another German invasion AND the abandonment of Lenin's conception that the fate of the USSR depended on the world revolution in favour of the reactionary, utopian and anti-Marxist "theory" of socialism-in-one-country (announced after Lenin died) AND the brutality of the unnecessary irrationalities of the five-year plans. Stalin and the bureaucracy maneuvered with short sighted an opportunist reactions to a crisis they had allowed to develop. Stalin's socialism-in-one-country was the ideology that reflected the material self interests of the bureaucracy that had emerged in an underdeveloped and isolated economy to ration out the shortage of goods and services. Lenin, a Marxist materialist, always insisted that socialism depended on the highest productivity of labor. In place of Marx and Engels "Workers of the world unite", Stalin offered (to summarize) "workers of each country unite, hope workers in other countries will do the same." By 1936 Stalin told American journalist Roy Howard in an interview that the Soviet Union "never had such plans and intentions" for world revolution. That this was the result of a misunderstanding, "a comical one. Or, perhaps, tragicomic." In 1943 to prove to his allies he didn't want world revolution he dissolved the Communist International (Comintern). FYI: ... "[Zhukov] acknowledged that Germany's achievement of surprised on 22 June assumed critical significance because the Red Army had failed to anticipate the striking power of the German army: 'This was the primary factor that determined our losses in the initial period of the war'. Zhukov's admission highlights an important puzzle about Soviet war planning on the even of Operation Barbarossa, whose significance could not be fully assessed until the recent opening of the Russian archives. This puzzle concerns the dangerous disconnection that existed before the outbreak of war between Soviet political strategy and military operational doctrine. From at least 1940, Stalin's German policy required that the Soviet Union maintain a non-provocative stance toward the Third Reich to eliminate any pretext for an invasion. The Red Army, therefore, could no longer expect an early and secret mobilisation against an impending German attack, overturning a central and long-standing planning assumption. Nevertheless, on the eve of war a majority of the best-trained and best-equipped Soviet military forces were forward deployed in an <i>offensive</i> posture along an 1800 kilometre border that left them dangerously exposed to German attack and encirclement. The puzzle looms even greater given that the Red Army was not only vulnerably deployed in June 1941; it was also perilously weak. The purge of the military, starting in 1937, had consumed the vast majority of senior officers and cut huge holes into the ranks of experienced middle-grade officers. This crippling blow came amid the chaos created by a vast programme of rapid military expansion ..." "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941" Cynthia A. Roberts Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 47, No. 8 (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293-1326www.jstor.org/stable/153299 FWIW: I would like to hear - a comparison of "Deep Operations" (Isserson) with "Deep Battle" (Tuchachevsky) - a discussion of the competing strategic doctrines developed in the Red Army. What was the doctrine behind the disbandment of the tank corps? Who wrote it?

Dr. Megargee mentions the word "rational" a couple of times. If the German armed forces should be known for one thing only it would have to be irrationality. Everything they did was irrational and the only difference between the early successes and the inevitable defeat was that their luck ran out and they met determined, organized resistance.

He's full of shit. What happened to the Diem brothers?

"Our defeated enemies were totally incompetent, but also this was our greatest victory."

Play these on the TV again. All old commercials should be played on TV again.

Palestinians have the worst conditions more than Jews 🥺 Pls promote Humanity and stop genocide in Palestine

As for those concerned about the has been Brittany Spears and the age of the attendees - glad you focused on the essential aspects of this very nicely done lecture. You belittle the enduring lessons of that horrible catastrophe and the ignorant clown that instigated it. And yet , even today we have such people as leaders or seeking to be such. The phenomenon of the evil dangerous pathological national leader willing to murder and enslave millions lives on.

Excellent - Socratic and innovative suggesting alternative somewhat unconventional and for the German command unflattering viewpoints. Helpful for a broader more inclusive way of thinking about that horrible calamity orchestrated by that criminal idiot Hitler.

Excellent - Socratic and innovative suggesting alternative somewhat unconventional and for the German command unflattering viewpoints. Helpful for a broader more inclusive way of thinking about that horrible calamity orchestrated by that criminal idiot Hitler.

What a fun seminar! One point and one question. IMHO the war ended for Germany when it had to divert resources to the Mediterranean to do what the Italians couldn't. Had said resources been in Russia - it could have been a different story. That is the turning point. Question: In 1943 (and 1944) with El Alamein and Stalingrad effectively ending the days of the Blitzkrieg and exposing German military vulnerability, what was the impact of the "die wunderwaffe" concept on the German Army? Did the command believe in the potential of military technology being able to change the course of the war? Germany did produce some remarkable stuff in the last coupla years.....

Young Sheldon brought me here

Wow so General Kesselring's name literally meant General Encirclement? Or Cauldron ring? Thats crazy

I remember reading somewhere that a German higher up was commenting after the war about Hitler's incompetence. He said something along the lines that Hitler would sweep his hand a few inches across a map without the feintest notion that he had just covered 500 miles. He (Hitler) seemed to actually approach warfare as though it were just that simple, no conception of the logistics and the food, water and ammunition etc. It's remarkable to me that so many German commanders MUST have known that this was a lost cause and yet...

I joined the US Army in 1988, and the "Be all that you can be" commercials were the only ones playing at that time. Each time I saw these commercials, they summarized for me and reinforced for me the reasons I was joining the Army. A sense of patriotism, of purpose, of growing and learning and stretching my self, of acquiring new skills and of serving this great nation (I was born in Cuba) and of great pride in serving in the greatest Army in the world, the United States Army!

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2:10:00

Thank you for your video. I cannot agree that Harrisburg was Lee's main objective. According to the general information Lee had a number of objectives yet did not consult pre Davis before beginning his action. The biggest objective was probably to resupply his army and possibly defeat the army of the Potomac on northern soil. A number of oast books have presented that Lee's whole army that he brought was a army wide foraging campaign. During the whole time outside of Virginia his army was very well provisioned. Some by thr quartermasters paying with Confederate money or impressing many items they wanted. The quartermasters came with well established lists of what they wanted of every kind of supplies. To a large number of Maryland and Pennsylvanians this was like a group of pirates coming in to grab whatever they wanted. Keep in mind during the Confederate incursions north a number of cities were ransomed by the rebels. One example thr Maryland city of Middletown was ransomed and you it took til thr 1950's for the Town to pay back the money that was demanded by the rebels. I never heard of union armies demanding such heavy handed events in any southern cities. Also recently information on the condition of the army of the Potomac before during and slightly after with a breakdown of supplying the feed for horses and mules and a suspension of food for feeding the AOP did not get corrected till after the campaign was over. That the army of the Potomac won and defeated Lee who was overwhelmingly provisioned speaks of the leadership of Meade and the coordination of the army to defeat its enemy. During the battle 15,000 horses and mules died for lack of any feed. I appreciate your talk but feel a reassessment of your material would make a much more accurate talk. Understand the information on thr dire supply situation was not presented until a year or two ago. Thanks again and I wish you well.

The turning point was Jan 28 1942 when Bill Knudsen was hired as Lt General of Army and figured out how to mass produce planes, ships, guns. America’s manufacturing under Bill’s leadership won the war.

15:38 a book called "recipes of blitzkrieg" featuring recipes and foods from the combatant nations in 1939, would probably sell.

I liked the speaker’s mention of the US reaction after not winning in Vietnam to show that the Germans weren’t unique in blaming civilians for a military loss.